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1. Introduction 
 
The idea that voting behavior is determined by material self-interest is a fundamental 
assumption in numerous economic models, with the Meltzer and Richard (1981) paradigm of 
redistribution as a prominent example. In contrast, the empirical evidence in favor of self-
interested voting is surprisingly weak. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) note that there are 
about 400 published studies on economic voting, and conclude that the cumulative support for 
“pocketbook voting” is marginal at best. Pocketbook voting usually refers to self-interested 
economic voting in general, but the empirical tests have typically relied on the specific 
assumption that voters attribute all changes in their financial situations to the policies of the 
incumbent government.1 While judging the incumbent government by one’s own pocketbook 
can be a useful information shortcut in some cases, there are plenty of confounding factors. 
For example, it appears implausible that a voter should be more inclined to support the 
incumbent government if she earns more money after having graduated, or for some other 
reason that is unrelated to government policy.2 In this paper we introduce a new approach to 
investigate the empirical relevance of pocketbook voting. 
 
We start out by presenting a theory of pocketbook voting in which citizens respond to the 
influence of proposed or implemented policies on their personal economic situation. The 
model allows for both prospective and retrospective voting. Prospective voting means that 
voters base their expectations of future policies on electoral platforms. Retrospective voting 
means that they base them on past performance.3  
 
In the empirical investigation we establish a causal chain from policy proposals to sizeable 
individual gains and losses, and in a second step from individual gains and losses to voting. 
As mentioned above, this link from expected policies to personal finances has been missing in 
previous empirical studies. We identify a group of voters who are affected by two significant 
policy shifts. Parents with young children were singled out for a relatively unfavorable 
treatment according to the electoral platform of the Swedish Social Democratic Party before 
the 1994 election, but were given especially generous promises by this party just before the 
1998 election. By comparing parents with young and parents with older children (who were 
largely unaffected by the policy changes) we obtain exogenous variation in the gains and 
losses from the reforms.  
 
Since both reforms were implemented during the following parliamentary term we 
discriminate between prospective and retrospective voting by tracking the votes of parents 
with young and parents with older children over several elections. The emerging voting 
pattern provides striking evidence of prospective pocketbook voting. Parents with young 
children respond when the reforms appear as election campaign promises, and not when the 
reforms are later implemented. While our study of two groups of parents is primarily designed 
to identify the causal effect of public expenditures on individual voting, some tentative 
calculations show that pocketbook voting may be an important determinant of election 
outcomes. At face value, our estimates suggest that the generous promise to parents with 
                                                 
1 Empirical studies in this literature include Fiorina (1978), Kinder and Kiewiet (1979), Markus (1988, 1992), 
Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 1998), Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001), and Jordahl (2006). 
2 Gomez and Wilson (2001) acknowledge the diffuse attribution in traditional tests of pocketbook voting, but 
rather than focusing on how policies affect personal finances, they argue − somewhat paradoxically − that only 
the politically sophisticated let the development of their personal finances determine how they vote. 
3 Hibbs (2006) provides an informative overview of retrospective and prospective voting in macroeconomic 
models. MacKuen et al. (1992) show that the time series of presidential approval can be accounted for by the 
prospective economic expectations of American voters, but not by their retrospective economic experiences. 
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young children resulted in an electoral gain of approximately 1.5 percentage points for the left 
bloc of parties in the 1998 election. Such an increase exceeds the margin of victory in 5 out of 
19 Swedish postwar elections. 
 
A few previous studies provide related evidence from varying applications and settings. To 
start with, self-interested voting is a keystone in theoretical models of tactical redistribution 
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) 
provide empirical support for the prediction that governments tactically target redistribution to 
swing voters, suggesting that influential politicians believe that citizens vote their 
pocketbooks. Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that federal spending on assistance programs in a 
U.S. congressional district benefits the congressional incumbent electorally. However, they do 
not find any effect from direct transfers to individuals. From our theoretical perspective of 
pocketbook voting, one explanation for this could be that they do not control for how 
incumbents have voted on entitlement programs. Edlund and Pande (2002) provide a 
motivation for studying pocketbook voting based on the U.S. political gender gap. They trace 
the rise of this gender gap to the decline in marriage and argue that the rising support for the 
Democratic Party among women can be explained by selfish preferences for redistribution 
driven by changes in personal income. 
 
In a recent paper, Richter (2006) analyzes economic voting in the Russian presidential 
election of 1996, which was branded as a fundamental choice between capitalism and 
communism. Despite repeated orders by President Yeltsin to pay off wage arrears, every other 
worker in the private and public sector experienced nonpayments of wages at the time of the 
election. Richter uses a matching model to demonstrate that workers whose wages were not 
paid in time were less likely to vote for the incumbent president. Unlike Richter, we study a 
mature democracy and compare prospective with retrospective voting. 
 
Other explanations of voting behavior include group voting (Mutz and Mondak, 1997), social 
background (Campbell et al., 1960), beliefs about the causes of income (Fong, 2001; Alesina 
and Angeletos, 2005), and voting responses to the macroeconomy (Fair, 1978). While we 
cannot compare the importance of pocketbook voting with other voting models – 
macroeconomic voting in particular – an advantage with our empirical strategy is that none of 
the alternative explanations confounds our estimates.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
Previous empirical studies have been quite vague when it comes to defining prospective and 
retrospective voting. To formally define those central concepts and to provide structure for the 
empirical investigation, we start by developing a theoretical framework of pocketbook 
voting.4  
 
We analyze voter choices between two political parties, denoted by L for the party on the left 
and R for the party on the right. We take as our starting point Persson and Tabellini’s (2000) 
workhorse model of probabilistic voting in which it is assumed that promises made by 
political parties are always fulfilled. We extend the model by allowing voters to regard 
promises as non-binding. As our focus is on introducing a theoretical framework that allows 
for empirical tests of different hypotheses about voting behavior, we take party platforms as 
                                                 
4 The major previous contributions are Downs (1957), Key (1966), and Fiorina (1981). A common feature of 
these models is that voters do not care about promises. Nor is it the case that the agency approach to elections 
and politics championed by Besley (2006) leaves any room for promises.    
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given. Our approach is compatible with different views on party behavior, including both 
office-motivations and ideological considerations.  
 
2.1 Voting with given expected policies 
For simplicity, we analyze the likelihood that citizen j, belonging to an identifiable group m, 
votes for party L. The group index is meant to capture the fact that large amount of transfers 
are targeted to specific groups, like parents of young children, pensioners, or people registered 
as unemployed. We denote the gross income that citizen j receives in period t by tjY , . A 
period is defined so that it includes both an electoral campaign and the subsequent 
parliamentary term. The political parties present their platforms at the beginning of the period. 
After this, citizens vote and the winner forms the government. During the rest of the period, 
the government decides on tax schedules and income transfers, and the incomes of the citizens 
are realized.  
 
We denote the after-tax income that citizen j would receive if party K, },{ RLK ∈ , were in 
power by )( ,tj
K
t YN . This net income is calculated in the absence of group-specific transfers, 
and it does not have group-specific indices, to capture the idea that the income tax schedule is 
typically independent of age, and many other demographic characteristics that affect transfers. 
The benefits that members of group m would receive if party K were in power are denoted 
by K tmB , . We also allow for a general popularity parameter in favor of party L in period t, 
denoted by κt. Popularity is allowed to vary between elections and could take either positive 
or negative values. It reflects issues like perceived competence or likability of current party 
leaders. 
 
Finally, citizens have (unobservable) individual-specific ideological preferences. Without loss 
of generality, we denote ideological preference of citizen j in favor of party L by jz , negative 
values implying an ideological preference in favor of party R. The ideological preference 
incorporates different ways in which the parties may differ. In addition to economic policy, 
voters may care, to varying extents, on social issues, environmental regulation, and foreign 
policy. In line with Persson and Tabellini (2006), we further assume that utility has a linearly 
additive structure. We can now write the expected utility of citizen j in group m of having 
party L in power as 
 
.)())(()( ,,, jt
L
tmtj
L
t
L
tj zBEYNEUE +++= κ    (1) 
 
Likewise, the expected utility of having party R in power is 
 
).())(()( ,,,
R
tmtj
R
t
R
tj BEYNEUE +=     (2) 
 
We assume that citizens vote for the political party giving the higher expected utility. From 
Equation (1) and (2), citizen j in group m prefers party L if: 
 
).())(()())(( ,,,,
R
tmtj
R
tjt
L
tmtj
L
t BEYNEzBEYNE +>+++ κ   (3) 
   
We next define a shorter term to denote the expected monetary difference in after-tax income 
from party L being in office (relative to party R) for voter j: 
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)).()(()( ,,, tj
R
ttj
L
ttj YNYNEME −=     (4) 
 
Rearranging (3) and using (4), we obtain 
 
.0)()( ,,, >++−+ jtR tmL tmtj zBBEME κ     (5) 
 
The inequality in (5) tells us that the choice between party L and party R depends on the 
difference in after-tax income between the L and R platforms, the difference in transfers 
between the L and R platforms, the general popularity parameter in favor of L, and the 
citizen-specific ideological preference for L. Citizen j votes for L if and only if the sum of 
these terms is positive. The term )()( ,,,
R
tm
L
tmtj BBEME −+  measures the pocketbook voting 
motivation in favor of party L. We simplify the analysis by assuming that the expected 
monetary difference in after-tax income between the L and R platforms is the same for all 
individuals, denoted by M . Under this assumption, we can obtain a cutoff ideological 
preference parameter )(ˆ , Mz tm  that denotes the group-specific ideological threshold above 
which a citizen votes for L:5 
 
.)()(ˆ ,,, t
R
tm
L
tmtm BBEMMz κ−−−−=     (6) 
 
If we further follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) and assume that the ideological preference 
parameter z follows a uniform distribution on the interval [ ]zz, , we can use equation (6) to 
calculate the vote share that party L receives. To allow for different ideological preferences in 
different groups, we assume a group specific uniform distribution of mz on [ ]mm zz , . The 
probability that a citizen belonging to group m votes for party L is given by equation (7): 
 
mm
mtm
tm zz
zMz
Q −
−= )(ˆ ,, .     (7) 
 
2.2 Policy expectations  
So far, we have taken citizens’ expectations concerning policies to be implemented as given. 
The next step is to formalize how expected policies are related to party platforms and previous 
policies. We allow for four components in citizens’ expectations. First, the two parties have 
an underlying ideology. We denote the monetary benefits that group m expects from party K, 
based on the latter’s ideology, by KmI . This permanent component takes into account that 
some groups of citizens may be associated with one of the parties, like labor unions with the 
left party and entrepreneurs with the right party, or that some groups expect equally generous 
transfers from both parties, as might be the case with pensioners. 
 
                                                 
5 At the cost of notational complexity, we could specify groups corresponding to different income ranges.  The 
subsequent analysis would then be written separately for individuals belonging to each income range. In the 
empirical part of the paper, we first present results when ignoring income differences (arguing that we compare 
two groups with similar incomes), and then show in appendix B that controlling for income differences does not 
change the qualitative results. 
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Second, citizens may react to electoral promises. We measure the promise-dependent 
expectation component, K tmG , , as the difference between party K’s platform, denoted by 
K
tmP , , 
and permanent ideological component, KmI : 
K
m
K
tm
K
tm IPG −= ,, . The variable K tmG ,  thus measures 
how generous promises party K makes to group m in period t, relative to what group m could 
expect, based on party ideology. 
 
Third, citizens may at least partly base their expectations on a party’s track record of 
implemented policies. If party K formed the government in period t-1, we denote by K tmH 1, −  
the difference between the transfers that it gave to group m, and what the party’s ideology 
gives reason to expect: Km
K
tm
K
tm IBH −= −− 1,1, . If party K was in opposition in period t-1, we 
define .01, =−K tmH  As an opposition party cannot implement policies, citizens cannot observe 
its realized generosity toward their group. 
 
Fourth and finally, we allow for the possibility that citizens may respond to differences 
between implemented policies by the governing party and its previous electoral promises. If 
party K formed the government in period t-1, we define as a term measuring deviation 
between implemented policies and electoral promises: .1,1,1,
K
tm
K
tm
K
tm PBJ −−− −=  If K was not in 
the government, we define .01, =−K tmJ  
 
To facilitate the empirical investigation, we assume a simple additive structure of expectations 
as a function of these terms: 
 
,)( 1,1,,,
K
tm
K
tm
K
tm
K
m
K
tm JHGIBE −− +++= χμλ    (8) 
 
where λ is the weight that the citizen attaches to the platform of party K, relative to what the 
citizen expects from party K based on ideology, μ measures the extent to which expectations 
of the governing party’s future policies react to its generosity, relative to its ideological 
standpoint, during the concluding term, and χ measures the extent to which expectation of the 
governing party’s future policy reacts to difference between its past policy and past platform. 
It is reasonable to expect that 0 ≤ λ, μ, χ ≤ 1, and that 0 ≤ λ + μ ≤ 1.6 It is natural to interpret λ 
as the likelihood that the winning party will implement its promises. In a political system with 
a high level of trust and credible party promises, λ would approach unity, while it would be 
close to zero in the opposite case. 
 
Equation (8) is general enough to allow as special cases different views on political 
competition and the formation of expectations. If λ = µ = χ = 0, then citizens would ignore 
both platforms and implemented policies, and base their expectations about future policies 
solely on the characteristics of the party’s permanent ideology. If political platforms are 
viewed as cheap talk, then λ=0. We find it reasonable that under such circumstances χ=0; if 
current electoral promises are considered to be cheap talk, so are past promises. If µ=0, then 
citizens do not change their expectations about future policies of the governing party based on 
its current policies, while if µ>0 voters expect that future policies are positively correlated 
with past policies.  One way to motivate µ>0 is that citizens may update their beliefs about the 
                                                 
6 Allowing λ+μ to be larger than one could result in a peculiar case in which the political party in government 
could change a transfer toward a group and then state that it will maintain the new level of transfers, but with 
citizens expecting that the party would again change the transfer in the same direction. 
 6
competence of the government, based on its past policies. Transfers which are more generous 
than expected from party ideology may signal either that the governing party is actually 
ideologically more favorable toward the targeted group than previously thought, or that the 
current party leadership is exceptionally generous. Exceptional generosity can depend on 
competence, tactical considerations or a combination of the two. 
 
Inserting equation (8) into equation (5), we obtain the following condition for voting party L: 
 
.0)()(
)()()(
1,1,11
,,,
>+−+−+
−+−++
−−−− t
R
tm
L
tm
R
t
L
t
R
tm
L
tm
R
m
L
mtjj
JJHH
GGIIMEz
κχμ
λ
   (9) 
 
The inequality in (9) implies that citizens have both ideological and economic motivations, 
and that party choice also depends on how expectations are formed.  
 
2.3 Formalizing the pocketbook voting hypotheses 
For the empirical analysis, we can now specify two types of pocketbook voting. We view 
pocketbook voting as retrospective if µ>0, and as prospective if λ>0. Pocketbook voting is 
only retrospective if λ=0 and µ>0. Note that the idea of prospective pocketbook voting can be 
expected to imply also that χ>0, i.e. that citizens roll back their support for political parties 
that do not deliver on their promises.7 We define prospective voting in a general form; the 
value of χ determines the degree to which citizens react to deviations from past promises by 
the government. We formalize the definitions of prospective and retrospective pocketbook 
voting as: 
 
Definition 1. Citizens engage in retrospective pocketbook voting if µ>0. 
 
Definition 2. Citizens engage in prospective pocketbook voting if λ>0. 
 
According to definition 1, retrospective pocketbook voting means that citizens react to 
implemented policies.8 According to definition 2, prospective pocketbook voting means that 
citizens are responsive to promises by political parties.9 The definitions imply that prospective 
and retrospective voting may coexist. It is left for the empirical analysis to evaluate their 
relative strength in cases where they push for different voting behavior. Therefore, definitions 
1 and 2 translate into two testable hypotheses: 
                                                 
7 If λ >0 and µ = χ = 0, voters would be naive in the sense that a political party could increase its vote share by 
making generous promises to a certain group without ever implementing any promises. 
8 Conceptually, we can distinguish two types of retrospective voting: predictive and reactive. Our theoretical 
model describes retrospective voting of the predictive type. A predictive retrospective voter − as the name 
indicates − tries to find out which party she prefers to have in office for the next period. The prediction is based 
on current policies and not on electoral promises. A reactive retrospective voter is “purely retrospective” in the 
sense that she rewards or punishes the incumbent government based on how she is affected by policies, 
regardless of what she expects for the next period of office. As the predictions of the two types of retrospective 
voting are similar in our empirical setting, we lump them together under the label of retrospective voting 
throughout our empirical investigation. 
9 Parties have to earn credibility by keeping previous promises, and if they do not we expect λ=0. Although this 
reasoning implies that previous promises and implemented policies will feed into λ, we keep this parameter 
exogenous in the model. Credibility may change slowly and is in any case fixed in a given election. In 
consequence, we expect retrospective voting to be relatively more important in an environment of broken 
promises. An intriguing topic would be to estimate responses to broken promises. Since we study reforms that 
were implemented as promised, this has to be left for future research. 
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Hypothesis 1. Assume that the government cuts (increases) benefits targeting group m, while 
it does not change benefits targeting group n. Then the electoral support for the government 
party decreases (increases) in group m, relative to group n, in the subsequent election. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Assume that party K proposes cuts (increases) in benefits targeting group m, 
while it does not propose changes in benefits targeting group n. Then the electoral support for 
K should decrease (increase) in group m, relative to the support in group n, in the current 
election. 
 
2.4 From theory to empirics 
To start with, the fact that politics is multi-dimensional provides a major empirical challenge. 
In order to test our hypotheses and estimate the impact of a given policy, one should compare 
voting behavior between individuals who are similarly affected by other policies than the one 
under study. Furthermore, the citizens who are affected by a policy change should have voted 
as the comparison individuals if they had not been treated differently by the policy change. 
We have noted that the total pocketbook motivation in favor of party L is 
)()( ,,,
R
tm
L
tmtj BBEME −+ . Our empirical approach will be to focus on the second term 
(transfers), and try to hold the first term (taxes) constant. This is accomplished by 
investigating voting responses to child care reforms among parents with young children 
compared with responses of parents with somewhat older children who were largely 
unaffected by the same reforms. The underlying idea is that the new child care policies 
affected the economic situation of parents with young children (the treatment group) to a 
much larger extent than parents with older children (the control group). From now on we 
denote the treatment group by T and the control group by C. Without loss of generality, and in 
line with the empirical analysis, we focus on the case in which party L changes its platform 
and subsequently implements this change. 
 
To connect our theoretical framework with the empirical difference-in-differences 
specification, we assume that the vote share of party L developed similarly in the treatment 
and in the control group before the policy change appeared as a new part of an election 
platform.10 Therefore, the ideological cutoff parameter that the individuals belonging to these 
groups face is the same before the treatment, for any given level of monetary difference in 
after-tax earned income: ).(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ 11,1, MzMzMz ttCtT −−− ==  We also assume that the individual-
specific ideological preference parameters follow the same uniform distribution in the 
treatment and control groups, so that zzz TC ==  and zzz TC == . We can now write the 
probability that a voter belonging to the treatment (or control) group votes for L in period t-1 
as 
 
.
)(ˆ 1
1,1, zz
zMzQQ ttCtT −
−== −−−     (10) 
As we analyze elections in which party R did not change its electoral platforms toward the 
treatment group or control group, and party L did not change its policies toward the control 
group, we assume that ),()( ,1,
R
tT
R
tT BEBE =−  ),()( ,1, R tCR tC BEBE =−  and ).()( ,1, L tCL tC BEBE =−  The 
probability that a citizen belonging to the control group votes for L in period t is now 
                                                 
10 Note, in passing, that this assumption is satisfied in our empirical analysis. 
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.
)(ˆ 11
, zzzz
zMzQ ttttC −
−+−
−= −− κκ      (11) 
 
The second term in equation (11) captures the effect of change in the general popularity 
parameter in favor of L. The probability that a voter belonging to the treatment group votes 
for L is now 
 
.
)()(ˆ 1,,11
, zz
BBE
zzzz
zMzQ
L
tT
L
tTttt
tT −
−+−
−+−
−= −−− κκ    (12) 
 
The third term of equation (12) captures the effect of changes in the expected benefit from L. 
Our basic difference-in-differences model can be written as 
 
, ,i t i t i t i tVote T p T pα β γ δ ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ,    (13) 
 
where Votei,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if at time period t (t=1,2), respondent i votes 
for L. Ti is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent belongs to the treatment 
group, and pt is a time period dummy that takes the value 0 in the election before and 1 in the 
election after the proposal or the policy change under study. The parameter of interest is δ 
which measures the effect of the policy changes on the treated group. α measures the fraction 
of voters in the control group that vote for L in the first period, β accounts for differences in 
support for L in the first election between the treatment and control group. γ captures the 
change in voting between the first and second election in the control group, and εi,t is an error 
term. The parameters α, β, γ and δ arise from equations (10), (11) and (12) in the following 
way: 
 
.
)(
;;0;
)(ˆ 1,,11
zz
BBE
zzzz
zMz L tT
L
tTttt
−
−=−
−==−
−= −−− δκκγβα   (14) 
 
Inserting equation (8) into the expression for δ in equation (14) gives 
 
, , 1 , 1 , 21 2 .
L L L LL L
m t m t m t m tt tG G J JH H
z z z z z z
δ λ μ χ− − −− −− −−= + +− − −    (15) 
 
In equation (15), the first term measures the prospective voting response to changes in party 
L’s platform. The second term measures the retrospective response to the generosity of party 
L if it were in the government. Note that LtH 2−  refers to the generosity before the previous 
election, if L was in government at that time. This term captures the idea that voters reacted to 
what happened in period t-2 already in the election at the beginning of period t-1, and no 
longer in the election in period t. One potential explanation for such a limited memory is that 
politicians change over time, so that voters might not react to what happened in the more 
distant past. The third term refers to potential voter reactions in case L has deviated from its 
promises when being in government.  
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3. Two child care reforms  
 
Sweden is a welfare state characterized by high taxes and generous welfare benefits even 
compared with other Nordic countries. For decades, the Social Democratic Party has been the 
largest party and has usually formed a minority government supported by the (formerly 
Communist) Left Party. Since World War II, the centre-right parties received enough seats in 
Parliament to form a government only in four general elections (1976, 1979, 1991, and 2006), 
most of the time as a majority coalition.  
 
We make use of the fact that parents with young children were promised diametrically 
different treatments in the 1994 and 1998 election platforms of the Social Democratic Party, 
whereas parents with older children were largely unaffected by these proposals. The details of 
this empirical strategy are spelled out in Section 4. In the rest of this section we give a brief 
description of the two child care reforms that appeared as election promises in 1994 and 1998, 
focusing on how the incidence differed between parents with younger and parents with older 
children. Both reforms were at the center of the national election campaigns in which they 
appeared, making it very likely that most citizens were aware of them.  
 
3.1 Financing the budget deficit  
In the early 1990s the Swedish economy ended up in a severe crisis combining a surge in 
unemployment and huge budget deficits. As a result, the political parties tried hard to 
persuade voters in the 1994 election campaign that they were able to deal with the budget 
crisis. The main proposals of the centre-right coalition government were cuts in pension 
benefits and a promise to be tougher on tax evasion and fraudulent behavior in the social 
welfare systems. Apart from a traditional, unspecific proposal of tax increases for high 
income earners, the Social Democratic Party also proposed an unexpected and detailed way of 
fighting the budget deficit: major cuts in public support to parents with young children. Three 
of the proposals were particularly disadvantageous for parents with young children.  
 
First, the centre-right government coalition had introduced a child-raising allowance in 1994. 
Families with children between one and three years old who did not use publicly subsidized 
child care received a cash transfer of € 220 (net of tax) per month.11 Both the Social 
Democratic Party and the Left Party opposed the introduction of the child-raising allowance 
and declared that they would repeal this law if they won the election. They won and the child-
raising allowance was abolished already from January 1, 1995.  
 
Second, parents who care for sick children are entitled to compensation for lost labor income 
from the social insurance system. In the election campaign of 1994 the Social Democrats 
declared that they would introduce a day of qualification before compensation could be 
claimed so that the first day of caring would not be compensated.  The proposal met severe 
criticism since it was claimed that lone mothers would suffer hard from this change. But the 
Social Democrats insisted that it was needed to balance the budget. At the time of the election 
in 1998 this part of the reform had not been implemented. 
 
Figure 1 shows the average number of qualification days that would be imposed on parents 
with one child if the sickness pattern of children would be the same, after the introduction of 
the qualification day, as it was before. Clearly, parents with young children have more to lose 
                                                 
11 1€ equals about 9 SEK. Families with children who participated part time in public child care were entitled to 
a smaller subsidy. 
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from a day of qualification, since young children are sick more often than older children.12  A 
typical worker that stays at home 2.5 times per year would loose about € 130 per year (net of 
tax) if this change would be implemented.13  
 
Figure 1. Average number of sickness periods with compensation per child in 1994 
 
Source: The Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
 
Third, in the summer of 1994 the Social Democrats unexpectedly proposed to reduce the 
compensation level in the parental insurance from 90 to 80 percent after the election.14 Such 
an initiative was at odds with a long left bloc tradition of generous compensations to parents 
but was well in line with most of the centre-right parties’ policies, and can definitely be seen 
as a change in relative positions.15 After the election, the compensation was reduced to 80 
percent from January 1995. For a parent working in the private sector this implied a loss of 
€ 107 per month net of tax, during parental leave.16 
 
Together these three proposals constituted a child care reform which would significantly 
worsen the economic situation of parents with young children. The repeal of the child-raising 
allowance affected parents with children between 1 and 3 years. The introduction of a 
qualifying day for benefits when taking care of sick children would also primarily affect 
parents with young children. The reduction of benefits in the parental insurance almost 
exclusively affected parents with children aged 0 to 2. There are strong reasons to believe that 
the described proposals mattered to voters. In a description of the 1994 election, Widfeldt 
(1995) highlights that promises of spending increases were absent in the campaign and that 
especially the Social Democratic Party’s proposal to cut the public support for families with 
young children led to an intense debate.   
 
                                                 
12 The reason why there are so few sickness periods for children up to one year old is that one parent is typically 
not working and hence not entitled to compensation when caring for a sick child. 
13 Based on the average daily salary for private sector workers in 1995, which was € 76, and a 30 percent tax 
rate. 
14 The Swedish parental insurance is very generous compared with other European countries. In 1994 parents 
could claim compensation for about one year’s loss of earnings when staying at home with a newborn child. The 
compensation can be spread out over many years. In practice, however, a large majority of the compensation is 
claimed during the child’s first or second year. 
15 The Liberal Party initially opposed the reduction in the compensation level, but after the Social Democrats had 
reached an agreement with the other centre-right parties they finally also supported the agreement. 
16Based on a daily salary of € 76, 20 working days per month, and 30 percent tax rate, 
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3.2 The cap on child care fees 
In the election campaign of 1998, the Social Democratic Party promised to introduce a fee cap 
on child care services that would substantially reduce the child care fees for most families 
with young children. This reform targeted a well defined group of voters with a high take-up 
rate: in 1998 about 73 percent of all children aged 1 to 5 participated in publicly subsidized 
child care.17 Although child care fees had been discussed for some time, the electorate and 
even most Social Democrat ministers were surprised when a tangible reform proposal was 
presented as an election promise in the party’s election manifesto. The manifesto had been 
prepared secretly by the Prime Minister and a few confidants, and was published one month 
before Election Day. It included the following promise:  
 
No other group has carried the burden of the economic crisis as heavily as families with 
children. Not even the most unprotected and innocent – the children – were unaffected by 
the economic crisis. We have therefore increased child benefits and introduced free 
medical services for children. To further improve the situation of families with children, 
and to encourage more parents to start working or to increase their hours of work, we 
would like to implement a cap on child care fees in the entire country at SEK 700 [€ 78 
per month] for the first child and with lower fees for subsequent children. The reduction 
in child care fees should be at least SEK 200 [€ 22] for everyone. A fee cap should also 
be introduced in after school recreation centers at SEK 500 [€ 56]. The municipalities will 
be compensated for their loss of revenues.18 
 
The opposition did not support the idea of a cap on child care fees in the election campaign of 
1998. In November 2000, the parliament voted in favor of introducing the fee cap reform.19 
The parties belonging to the centre-right bloc presented different alternatives but did not agree 
on any counter-proposal. In his note on the 1998 election, Arter (1999) brings up the promise 
to reduce day care fees as one of the most important issues of the campaign.   
 
The reform was implemented on January 1, 2002. All municipalities but two implemented the 
fee cap from the beginning and the remaining two did so one year later.20 The fee cap was set 
to a maximum of three percent of family gross income or € 127 for the first child, two percent 
or € 84 for the second child, and one percent or € 42 for the third child, granted that they were 
all in child care. For additional children, child care was made free of charge.21 
 
The fee cap substantially reduced the child care costs of many families. A family with a 
“normal” income and two children in child care 33 hours per week gained € 113 per month in 
the municipality with median fees and € 238 in the municipality with the highest fees in 
                                                 
17 This statistic comes from the Swedish National Agency for Education (1999). Note however that the fraction 
of children who participate in publicly subsidized child care between the age of 2 and 5 is even larger than 73 
percent since most of the children who do not participate in child care at a given time are under two years old. 
18 Taken from the 1998 election manifesto of the Social Democratic Party, ”Med omtanke om framtiden – 
Socialdemokraternas politik inför 2000-talet”. (Our translation, the original text is in Swedish.) The mentioned 
changes in child benefits and medical fees had marginal economic consequences and also did no differ much 
between parents with young and parents with older children.   
19 Although The Left Party and The Green Party initially were against the reform, they voted with the Social 
Democrats.   
20 Child care is the responsibility of municipalities, but by compensating for lost revenues, the central 
government gave each municipality a strong incentive to adopt the cap on child care fees. 
21 Parents with children in after-school care also benefited from the reform, but to a considerably smaller degree. 
The reduction in after-school care fees was much smaller, and in addition fewer children attend after-school care.  
 12
1999.22 These gains constitute approximately five and ten percent of the family’s monthly net 
income. 
 
It is evident that the fee cap reform would substantially improve the financial situation of a 
vast majority of families with young children. Specifically, parents with children aged 0 to 4 
at the time of the election in 1998 would benefit the most from this election promise. 
 
Figure 2 describes the timing of the election campaign promises and their implementation. 
Note the change of government in the 1994 election.  
 
Figure 2. Timing of election promises and implementations 
 
Note: SDP = Social Democratic Party. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
The two Swedish child care reforms (described in Section 3) are exceptionally well suited for 
testing the pocketbook voting hypothesis. First of all, since both reforms were described with 
unusual clarity in the election manifestos of the Social Democratic Party they provide a link 
from policies to individual gains and losses. Second, both reforms were implemented, 
allowing us to test whether voters responded to reform proposals already when they appeared 
as campaign promises, or only after they were implemented.23 A third attractive feature of the 
reforms is that significant individual benefits were at stake. Since elections are 
multidimensional, one should not expect to find empirical relationships between voting and 
minor economic issues.  
 
                                                 
22 Fees before and after the reform for a family with a total monthly gross income of € 4,120 in 1999 and € 4,630 
in 2002 and with two children in child care 33 hours per week. Figures are taken from The Swedish National 
Agency for Education (1999, 2003). Figures from 2002 are transformed to 1999 years prices (factor 0.946 from 
the CPI of Statistics Sweden).  
23 Several studies show that election promises are often delivered on. In the United Kingdom about 80 percent of 
the election promises of the winner are implemented, while in the United States the Democrats and Republicans 
implement about 60 percent of their election promises (Royed, 1996). For Sweden and in our period of study 
(1994–2002), Naurin (2008) reports that the Social Democrats have fulfilled about 60 percent of their election 
promises and partially fulfilled another 25 percent of them. 
Sep 2002: Election.  
SDP remains in power. 
Sep 1998: Election.  
SDP remains in power. 
Aug 1998: SDP promises to put a 
cap on child care fees. 
Jan. 2002: Implementation of the fee 
cap reform. 
Nov 2000: Parliament votes in favor 
of a cap on child care fees. 
1994: SDP proposes reductions in 
public support to parents with young 
children. 
1995: Abolition of child-raising 
allowances. 
1995: Reduction of compensation in 
parental insurance. 
Sep 1994: Election.  
SDP defeats the centre-right government. 
1994: Introduction of 
child-raising 
allowances. 
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We test the pocketbook voting hypotheses by estimating difference-in-differences models 
separately for 1991 to 1994, for 1994 to 1998, and for 1998 to 2002, using equation (13). In 
our baseline specification our dependent variable is the vote share of the left bloc of parties 
consisting of the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party.24 But we also present all 
empirical results for the vote share of the Social Democratic Party alone.  
 
Our difference-in-differences model is given by equation (13), described in Section 2, where δ 
measures the effect of the policy changes on the treated group. Equation (14), which 
demonstrates how δ and the other parameters in the estimated equation (13) arise from the 
underlying theoretical model, is based on the assumption that there has not been any change 
in left bloc policies toward the treatment group (relative to the control group) in the previous 
election. This assumption is satisfied in the 1994 election.25 However, equation (13) holds 
also when there has been past policy changes, as in the elections of 1998 and 2002. The only 
difference in the empirical analysis is that in these latter elections, the terms α, β, and γ also 
reflect past policy changes, so that the prediction β=0 need not be satisfied. However, what 
matters is the estimated size and statistical significance of δ, so that equation (13) can be used 
also for those periods. 
 
We follow the reform descriptions in Section 3 and assign parents with children aged 0 to 4 to 
the treatment group and parents with children aged 6 to 11 to the control group. In both 
groups we include respondents who also have older children, but in the control group we do 
not include respondents who have younger children. We do not use respondents with children 
who are 5 years old since one could argue that they could belong to either the treatment or to 
the control group.26  
 
Studying two consecutive reforms that were both implemented after the election makes it 
possible to test if pocketbook voting is prospective or retrospective. Prospective pocketbook 
voting predicts the support for the Social Democratic Party to decrease among parents with 
young children in the election of 1994 (due to the proposal to let them finance the budget 
deficit), to increase in 1998 (due the promise to put a cap on child care fees), and to stay the 
same in 2002 (since the fee cap reform was implemented as promised). Retrospective voting 
also predicts a decrease in support for the Social Democratic Party in 1994 (due to the child-
raising allowance introduced by the centre-right government. In 1998 a further reduction is 
predicted (due to the abolition of child-raising allowances and the reduction of compensation 
in the parental insurance), and in 2002 the support is predicted to increase (due to the 
implementation of the fee cap). 
 
Table 1 displays the predicted voting responses for the prospective and for the retrospective 
hypotheses. In 1994 both hypotheses predict that parents with children aged 0 to 4 should 
decrease their support for the left bloc (and for the Social Democratic Party) relative to 
                                                 
24 The Left Party is a small party which has consistently supported Social Democratic minority governments. In 
the election campaign of 1994, the Left Party made the same promise as the Social Democratic Party to repeal 
the child-raising allowances and in 1995 they helped the Social Democratic government to do so. In 2000, the 
Left Party voted with the Social Democratic government to introduce the cap on child care fees. 
25 The centre right parties had consistently been in favor of the benefits they introduced in 1994, but having been 
in opposition since 1982 they had no opportunity to implement them in any of the previous elections covered in 
our study. The fact that we present the model in section 2 only for the policy changes by party L is without loss 
of generality. Any reaction in retrospective voting in favor of new benefits that the centre right parties introduced 
implies an opposite reaction in the support for the left bloc. 
26 By including respondents with five year old children in the control group, we obtain slightly higher treatment 
effects, while the opposite happens if we include them in the treatment group.   
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parents with children aged 6–11. In the election of 1998, the prospective prediction is positive 
and the retrospective prediction negative. In 2002, only retrospective voting predicts a 
response, which is positive.  
 
Table 1: Predicted treatment effects  
Election year 1994 1998 2002 
Age of children 0−4 vs. 6–11 0−4 vs. 6–11 0−4 vs. 6–11 
Type of voting    
Prospective Negative Positive No response 
Retrospective Negative Negative Positive 
 
For our estimations to give unbiased estimates of the treatment effects, two assumptions need 
to be fulfilled. First, the additive structure of equation (13) must be correct. This assumption 
is much weaker than assuming a fully linearly additive data generating process, which has 
been the standard specification in previous empirical studies of economic voting (Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2007). Second, the error term should be uncorrelated with treatment status. 
The most critical part of this assumption is known as the parallel trend assumption. This 
means that in absence of the policy changes, the treatment group would have changed its 
voting pattern just in the same way as the control group did. In practice this means that 
socioeconomic characteristics that determine party support must be stable within each group 
over time and that no other policy changes which affect the two groups differently occur at 
the same time.  
 
To ensure that we can be reasonably confident that these two assumptions are not violated, we 
have selected the control group to be as similar to the treatment group as possible (more on 
this in Section 5 and 6). This minimizes the risk that unrelated policy changes or other events 
affect the two groups differently. Importantly, the control group can be seen as being identical 
to the treatment group but moved forward in time. As a consequence, we can consider the 
assignment of parents to the treatment group or to the control group to be as good as random, 
since it is determined by the year in which their children are born. In section 5 we compare 
the voting pattern of the treatment and the control group over seven elections to make sure 
that the parallel trend assumption is not violated. Furthermore, we compare socioeconomic 
characteristics that are likely to influence voting, both between the groups and within the 
groups over time, to ensure that they are similar in other relevant respects and also have a 
stable composition over time. Finally, judging from the election platforms of all Swedish 
parties from 1982 to 2002, there are no comparable proposals affecting parents belonging to 
the treatment or to the control group.  
 
We calculate standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation between 
individuals that appear twice in the data. But, as pointed out by for example Donald and Lang 
(2007) and Wooldridge (2003), in the presence of unaccounted group-specific shocks and a 
small number of groups (two in our case), the standard errors are likely to be downward 
biased. In our case such a problem could arise if the treatment and control groups would be hit 
by shocks that are correlated within but not across the two groups. In this respect the time 
pattern of vote shares looks comforting as the early time periods give no reason to believe that 
our treatment and control groups are exposed to different shocks (see Figure 3 in section 5). 
Wooldridge (2003) proposes a test for whether group-specific shocks are present. Since the 
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test does not reject the null hypothesis that such shocks are absent, we are confident that the 
presented standard errors of the treatment effects are accurate.27  
 
5. Data and illustrative results 
 
The availability of high quality data at the individual level constitutes a prerequisite for our 
empirical strategy. The Swedish Election Studies sample about 3,000 individuals drawn from 
the population of eligible voters with two exceptions: those living abroad and those older than 
80 years.28 This data set contains a multitude of background questions about the respondents 
and their partners, including the number and age of all children in the household. While the 
secrecy of the ballot unavoidably introduces uncertainty to individual voting data, the 
Swedish Election Studies have at least two features that make them attractive in international 
comparisons. First, turnout data from the electoral register is used to verify whether 
respondents who claimed to have voted actually did.29 Being able to exclude respondents who 
incorrectly claim to have voted eliminates problems associated with over-reporting of turnout, 
which has been widely discussed in connection with the American National Election Studies; 
see e.g. Belli et al. (2001). Second, the response rates are high in comparison with other 
election studies (between 69 and 81 percent in the 1991–2002 Swedish Election Studies).  
 
We first present the support for the left bloc in the general elections from 1982 to 2002, 
among parents with young and parents with older children. This visual inspection illustrates 
our empirical strategy and is quite suggestive of prospective pocketbook voting. The formal 
econometric analysis follows in Section 6. 
 
Figure 3 displays a pattern of prospective pocketbook voting. The support for the left bloc 
among parents with young children (relative to parents with older children) decreased in 1994 
when they were asked to pay for the budget deficit and increased in 1998 when the Social 
Democrats promised to put a cap on child care fees. The support is more stable in 2002 when 
no new promises were targeted at this group. 
 
It is evident that retrospective voting is incompatible with the pattern displayed in Figure 3. 
While the retrospective voting model (as described in Section 4) can be compatible with the 
1994 election, it fails to explain voting in 1998 (when it predicts that the benefit cuts will lead 
to decreasing support for the left bloc among parents with younger children) and in 2002 
(when it predicts that the implementation of the fee cap will lead to increasing support for the 
left bloc among parents with younger children). 
 
According to Figure 3, the voting patterns of the two groups seem to follow the same trend 
before the 1994 election. This means that in absence of the investigated policy changes it 
                                                 
27 When performing Wooldridge’s (2003) test we include all years simultaneously in the regressions, giving us 
seven elections and two groups. We estimate 11 parameters and therefore obtain 3 degrees of freedom. The test 
statistic is chi-square distributed and equals 0.14 when we study voting for the left bloc and 3.14 when we study 
voting for the Social Democratic Party alone. We are clearly on the safe side as the critical value at the 10 
percent level is 6.25. On the other hand, by including all elections we risk introducing another source of bias in 
the standard errors arising from serial correlation, see Bertrand et al (2004). To avoid this problem we present 
estimates based on two elections at a time.  
28 The election studies are made in the form of a two-step panel in which each respondent is interviewed twice 
and one half of them are replaced in each study. In the econometric analysis we use this information to cluster 
standard errors on individuals. 
29 Turnout in the Swedish national elections was 87 percent in 1991 and in 1994, 81 percent in 1998, and 80 
percent in 2002.  
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seems plausible to assume that our treatment group would have continued to vote in a similar 
way as the control group. Figure 3 also suggests that the change in the support for the left bloc 
differ between parents with younger and with older children only in 1994 and 1998. This 
impression is supported by statistical tests. All three placebo tests on the election pairs 1982–
1985, 1985–1988, and 1988–1991 (using the difference-in-differences approach as described 
in section 4) produce statistically insignificant treatment effects (P>0.1), regardless of 
whether we study votes for the left bloc or votes for the Social Democratic Party. In addition, 
Appendix C shows that the voting pattern of parents in the control group (with children 
between 6 and 11 years old) closely follows the voting pattern of parents with even older 
children (between 12 and 17 years old). This suggests that we do not identify our treatment 
effect by unobserved factors affecting our control group only. It also demonstrates that the 
parents in our 1998 and 2002 control groups do not seem to be affected by having received 
treatment in the preceding elections. 
 
Figure 3. Vote shares of the left bloc (Social Democratic Party and Left Party) 1982−2002 
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Note: respondents in both groups are allowed to have older children as well, but the respondents in 
the control group are not allowed to have younger children. 
 
Is it reasonable to believe that the voting pattern displayed in Figure 3 is a result of 
pocketbook voting? While it is typically not fruitful to ask people whether their vote choice is 
based on selfish motives, The Swedish Election Studies ask the following open question: 
“Think about the election this year. Are there any issues that you regard as important when it 
comes to choosing which party to vote for in the parliamentary election this year?” In 1994 
and 1998, 35.9 and 32.0 percent of the respondents with children aged 0 to 4 stated that issues 
related to family policies were important for their party choice. Interestingly, the 
corresponding numbers for the control group were 16.6 and 18.9 percent. These numbers 
point at two interesting patterns. First, a large fraction of parents state that policies directed at 
themselves are important for their party choice. Second, respondents with older children 
appear to care less about policies that would have been important to them only a few years 
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ago (when their children were younger). Both observations strengthen our interpretation that 
pocketbook voting is the driving force behind the voting differences between parents with 
young and parents with older children. The formal testing of this hypothesis is the subject of 
the next section. 
 
6. Econometric analysis 
 
Having inspected the development of the support for the left bloc visually, we now move on 
to formal econometric testing. By estimating Equation 13 (described in Section 2) we analyze 
responses to the policy changes (described in Section 3) in the elections of 1994, 1998, and 
2002. Recall, that before the 1994 election, the Social Democratic Party proposed several 
reductions in benefits for parents with young children. The reductions were, with one 
exception, implemented during the 1994–1998 term of office. Similarly, in the election year 
of 2002, the Social Democratic Party delivered on their promise from the 1998 election 
campaign to put a cap on child care fees.  
 
Table 2 contains the difference-in-differences estimates for the left bloc of parties. Column 1 
is based on changes in voting behavior between 1991 and 1994. The estimated Treatment 
effect shows the effect of the reform on the treatment group. The point estimate of −0.126 is 
statistically significant at the five percent level. This estimate implies that in 1994, the support 
for the left bloc was 12.6 percentage points lower in the treatment group than it would have 
been in the absence of any promises or changes in policy. The estimate for Control group 
(0.387) is in essence an estimate of the fraction of respondents in the control group that voted 
for the left bloc in 1991. The estimate for Treatment group difference shows that the fraction 
of respondents in the treatment group that voted for the left bloc in 1991 was 0.404 
(0.387+0.017). Time effect is an estimate of the change in support for the left bloc in the 
control group. While the 1994 treatment effect is consistent with pocketbook voting, it is not 
possible to distinguish between prospective and retrospective voting from this election only. 
  
In column 2, we look at the 1998 election. In this election the estimated treatment effect 
equals 0.135 and is again statistically significant at the five percent level. The estimate is 
consistent with prospective pocketbook voting, but not with voting that is retrospective only. 
If voting is both prospective and retrospective, the estimate captures the net effect of 
prospective voting (and implies that retrospective voting is less important).   
 
Column 3 focuses on the election in 2002. Since the fee cap reform was implemented before 
this election, retrospective voting predicts an increase in the support for the left bloc in the 
treatment group, whereas no voting response is predicted by the prospective voting 
hypothesis. If pocketbook voting is prospective, the voters should already have responded to 
the promise to reduce child care fees in 1998. The estimated treatment effect of −0.080 is not 
statistically different from zero. Prospective but not retrospective voting is consistent with the 
2002 election. 
 
When looking at the three elections together, a striking pattern of prospective pocketbook 
voting emerges. Pocketbook voting of the prospective type is consistent with the estimated 
treatment effect in all three elections. In contrast, retrospective voting is inconsistent with the 
voting pattern over the three elections. Although the negative treatment effect in 1994 could 
(partly) be due to retrospective voting, the positive treatment effect in 1998 contains at most a 
small retrospective effect, and the voting behavior in the 2002 election is inconsistent with 
 18
retrospective voting. The same prospective pattern emerges when we use votes for the Social 
Democratic Party as an alternative dependent variable, as reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 2: Estimates of pocketbook voting for the left bloc of parties 
Dep. var. Vote for left bloc (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 1994 1998 2002 
Age of children  0−4 vs. 6−11 0−4 vs. 6−11 0−4 vs. 6−11 
Treatment effect (δ) -0.126** 0.135** -0.080 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.069) 
Time effect (γ) 0.215*** -0.085* 0.008 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) 
Treatment group difference (β) 0.017 -0.108** 0.027 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.050) 
Control group (α) 0.387*** 0.602*** 0.518*** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) 
Socioeconomic controls No No No 
Type of voting    
Retrospective voting Consistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Prospective Voting Consistent Consistent Consistent 
Observations 1,071 908 830 
Notes: The left bloc includes the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party. The election year of 
1994 (1998, 2002) refers to a difference-in-differences estimation of 1994 vs. 1991 (1998 vs. 1994, 
2002 vs. 1998). Robust standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 3: Estimates of pocketbook voting for the Social Democratic Party (SDP)   
Dep. var. Vote for SDP (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 1994 1998 2002 
Age of children  0−4 vs. 6−11 0−4 vs. 6−11 0−4 vs. 6−11 
Treatment effect (δ) -0.144** 0.138** -0.066 
 (0.059) (0.066) (0.067) 
Time effect (γ) 0.159*** -0.115** 0.021 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.046) 
Treatment group difference (β) 0.056 -0.088* 0.049 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.049) 
Control group (α) 0.327*** 0.485*** 0.371*** 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.034) 
Socioeconomic controls No No No 
Type of voting    
Retrospective voting Consistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Prospective Voting Consistent Consistent Consistent 
Observations 1,071 908 830 
Notes: The election year of 1994 (1998, 2002) refers to a difference-in-differences estimation of 
1994 vs.1991 (1998 vs. 1994, 2002 vs. 1998). Robust standard errors clustered on individuals in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
If there are significant differences between the treatment and control groups, or if the 
compositions of the groups change over time, the estimated treatment effect may be biased. 
We therefore compare demographic and socioeconomic characteristics both between the 
groups and within the groups over time (see Table A2 and A3 in Appendix A). In our sample 
the fractions of singles increase over time in both the treatment and control groups. 
Furthermore, the fraction of unemployed is higher in the treatment groups, which as expected 
also are younger and have slightly lower income.30 As a robustness check we therefore 
                                                 
30 Out of the four elections underlying our difference-in-differences estimates, the income difference between the 
treatment and the control group is only statistically significant in 1994. 
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include the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in the regressions. It turns out that 
the results are robust to this inclusion. Detailed regression results are found in Table B1–B2 in 
Appendix B. The stability of our results indicates that our choice of control group is 
appropriate and strengthens the evidence in favor of pocketbook voting.  
 
The time one child can be in publicly subsidized child care is limited to about five years, as 
children can attend child care only when they are between one and six years old. This means 
that when the children have grown old enough to start school, the parents no longer benefit 
from reduced child care fees. This implies that parents with younger children will benefit 
from reduced child care fees for a longer period than parents with older children. Also the 
possibility of a late or even no implementation of the election campaign promise means that 
the expected value of the reform should decrease in the age of the children.  As a further test 
of our pocketbook voting hypothesis, we have performed a dose response test, using such 
variation. The point estimates of the dose response test, reported in Appendix D, are in line 
with our previous results. 
 
Compared with previous studies our analysis embodies several advantages. To start with, 
most previous studies of pocketbook voting have just assumed a diffuse attribution 
mechanism: that improved individual finances (or the expectation of this) can be ascribed to 
the government. This assumption that perceptions about economic outcomes are related to 
differences in policy between the government and the opposition will at the very least 
introduce substantial measurement error, and in consequence attenuation bias. The 
assumption that changes in people’s finances are uncorrelated with omitted determinants of 
voting is even more problematic.  
 
Having a negative treatment followed by a positive treatment for the same group also makes it 
somewhat more likely that the estimated treatment effect can be generalized to other groups. 
If the government actively tries to target benefits to the most responsive group (as suggested 
by models of tactical redistribution), the treatment effect cannot be generalized. Strictly 
speaking, the estimated treatment effect of each reform can only be generalized to the group 
of parents that received treatment – but the fact that this group first received a negative and 
then a positive treatment arguably makes it less likely that it was targeted because its 
members were unusually responsive.  
 
Our empirical strategy also rules out any confounding influence of the four alternative 
explanations of voting mentioned in the introduction. First, group voting is not a viable 
interpretation of the results when group membership is determined by economic gains. In 
addition, our treatment group – parents with children up to four years old – doesn’t resemble 
any of the groups Mutz and Mondak (1997) work with. Their groups are demarcated by sex, 
race, labor market participation, income, and self-identification with, or perceived closeness 
to, a social class.  
 
Second, social background is another possible source of bias. In a seminal contribution, 
Campbell et al. (1960) claim that party identification is formed early in life through 
socialization. In our setting, it is conceivable that age differences between the treatment and 
the (slightly older) control group could capture cohort effects that show up exactly in the 
elections in which treatment is assigned. While we view such an interpretation as quite far 
fetched a priori, we address this concern, nonetheless, as it still appears to be the strongest 
alternative explanation for our findings. 
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In particular, the estimated treatment effect in 1994 could be a spurious cohort effect either if 
the treatment group is unusually right-wing or if the control group is unusually left wing. We 
know from Figure C1 in Appendix C that the control group is not unusually left-wing when 
compared with parents with even older children aged 12–17. Figure 3 demonstrates the same 
thing as the “treatment group” of parents with young children in 1991 largely corresponds to 
the control group of parents with older children in 1994, and there is no difference between 
the “treatment” and “control” group in 1991. Thus the control group in 1994 does not seem to 
be an unusual cohort. But the treatment group in 1994 could still be special. In fact, both the 
estimated treatment effect in 1994 and in 1998 could be spuriously explained by an unusually 
right-wing treatment group in 1994, since the treatment group in 1994 enters the control group 
in 1998 as their children grow older. If this were the case, the same group of parents would 
also stand out in 2002 when their children have grown even older. But Figure C1 displays no 
such difference in 2002 between parents with children aged 12–17 and parents with children 
slightly younger than that. To conclude, there is no reason to believe that our empirical results 
are driven by cohort effects.    
 
Third, we focus on reforms where the voters’ attribution problem should be minimal. This 
leaves little room for different beliefs about the causes of income. Fong (2001) and Alesina 
and Angeletos (2005) argue that such beliefs shape political preferences for redistribution. 
 
Fourth, our results should be unaffected by macroeconomic conditions; see Fair (1978) for an 
early test of the electoral impact of such conditions. The reason is simply that the treatment 
and the control group face the same macroeconomic conditions. So as long as the distribution 
of individual reactions to the macroeconomic development does not differ between the 
treatment and the control group, the macroeconomic effects on voting development is 
captured by the general popularity parameter. And given the minimal voting differences 
between the treatment group and the control group in all elections before 1994, we see no 
reason to suspect that the two groups should react differently to the same macroeconomic 
events.  The four alternative theories could obviously play an important role in certain 
political settings, but none of them should confound our identification of pocketbook voting. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
We have presented a theoretical framework for pocketbook voting which results in two 
testable hypotheses. Our empirical analysis provides clear evidence of prospective 
pocketbook voting over several elections. This finding stands in sharp contrast to the previous 
literature where the support for pocketbook voting has been weak overall.  
 
The size of our treatment group implies that the pocketbook effect could be important for 
election outcomes. According to the Swedish Election Studies, our treatment group made up 
about 10.8 percent of the electorate (and 11.2 percent of the voters) in 1998. Together with 
our estimate of the 1998 treatment effect (which is 13.5 percentage points), the share suggests 
that the promise to put a cap on child care fees increased the support for the left bloc of parties 
by approximately 1.5 percentage points in the 1998 election.31 Although a reform effect of 1.5 
percentage points would not have tipped the scales in the 1998 election, it is clear that an 
effect of this size could affect the balance of power in closer races. The margin between the 
bloc of left parties and the bloc of centre right parties was less than 1.5 percentage points in 
                                                 
31 The 1.5 percentage point estimate should obviously be taken with great caution. There may for instance be a 
counterweighing effect if other voters expect their tax burden to increase as a consequence. Note, however, that 
this qualification doesn’t affect our main finding that citizens vote their pocketbooks. 
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five out of 19 postwar elections. The picture that emerges from our investigation is that 
pocketbook voting can influence election outcomes, providing a temptation for politicians to 
tactically redistribute tax revenues to certain groups of voters. 
 
The fee cap reform has been estimated to cost the taxpayers about €360 million per year.32  
By dividing this cost with the roughly 80,600 votes (1.5 percent of the total votes) that were 
swayed by this election promise, we get a crude cost estimate of about €4,500 per vote 
annually, corresponding to €18,000 over a four-year electoral period. Previous studies of 
pork-barrel spending have estimated the cost of a vote at about $14,000 (Levitt and Snyder, 
1997) and between $2,000 and $13,000 (Leigh, 2008). Despite the fact that these studies have 
analyzed voting at district level, while we use individual-level data, the estimated costs over 
an electoral term are quite similar in Sweden, Australia, and the United States. 
 
It is important to emphasize that we have only investigated pocketbook voting responses to 
two salient reforms, and not to other specific policies. As a next step, we believe that our 
theoretical framework and empirical strategy can be applied to reforms in other countries. 
Only by directly linking policies with individual gains and votes can pocketbook voting be 
credibly identified. Finally, since we have studied the case of election campaign promises that 
were later implemented, it is natural to study two alternative cases in our theoretical model. 
The first case is that of a campaign promise that is not implemented (or that is implemented to 
a larger or to a smaller extent than promised). The second case is that of an unexpected 
implementation of a policy that has not previously appeared as an election campaign promise.    
                                                 
32 According to calculations made by the Ministry of Education and Research (1999) this cost refers to the 
changes in child care fees that were promised in the 1998 election manifesto and relies on the assumptions that 
labor supply and child care demand were unaffected by the reform. Since Lundin et al. (2008) have shown that 
the reform had no effects on labor supply, the cost of the reform is probably underestimated as the reform seems 
to have increased the demand for child care (Swedish National Agency for Education, 2007). 
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 Appendix A: Description of data 
 
The Swedish Election Studies 
 
The variables in our data set are available at The Swedish National Data Service (SND). The 
data in the Swedish Election Studies were originally collected in a research project at the 
Department of Political Science at Göteborg University, under the guidance of Sören 
Holmberg, Mikael Gilljam, and Henrik Oscarsson. Neither SND nor the primary researchers 
are responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented in this paper. The sample of the 
Swedish Election Studies is drawn from a population of 18- to 80-year old Swedish citizens 
entitled to vote in the general election. Citizens living abroad are not included in the sample. 
The election studies are made in the form of a two-step panel in which each respondent is 
interviewed twice and one half of them are replaced in each study. The response rates were 82 
percent in 1982, 78 percent in 1985, 75 percent in 1988, 73 percent in 1991, 80 percent in 
1994, 81 percent in 1998, and 69 percent in 2002. 
 
Description of variables 
 
Table A1: Description of variables used in the analysis 
Variable Definition 
Vote for left bloc 1 if voted for the Social Democratic Party or the Left 
party; 0 otherwise. 
Vote for the Social Democratic Party 1 if voted for the Social Democratic Party; 0 
otherwise. 
Sex  
 
1 if female; 0 if male 
Marital status  1 if single; 0 if married with or cohabiting with 
another adult. 
Two children  1 if there are two children under age 18 living in the 
household; 0 otherwise. 
Three or more children 1 if there are three or more children under age 18 
living in the household; 0 otherwise. 
Income (€ 1,000) Gross earnings, referring to the income year two years 
prior to the survey year. Register based. Source: 
Statistics Sweden. 
Age Years of age 
Source: The Swedish Election Studies. 
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Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A2. Variable means for the treatment groups (parents with children aged 0 to 4 years old) 
 1991 1994 1998 2002 
Vote for left bloc 40.4 49.4 54.5 47.2 
 (35.3 – 45.7) (44.0 – 54.9) (47.3 – 61.5) (40.4 – 54.1) 
Vote for SDP 38.2 39.7 42.0 37.5 
 (33.2 – 43.5) (34.5 – 45.1) (35.1 – 49.2) (31.0 – 44.3) 
Sex (1= female) 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.52 
 (0.43 – 0.53) (0.47 – 0.58) (0.45 – 0.60) (0.45 – 0.59) 
Marital status (1=single) 0.031 0.047 0.055 0.074 
 (0.015 – 0.054) (0.027 – 0.075) (0.028 – 0.096) (0.043 – 0.118) 
Unemployed 0.033 0.103 0.085 0.069 
 (0.017 – 0.057) (0.073 – 0.140) (0.050 – 0.133) (0.039 – 0.11) 
Two children  0.41 0.41 0.51 0.42 
 (0.36 – 0.46) (0.36 – 0.46) (0.43 – 0.58) (0.35– 0.49) 
Three or more children 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.22 
 (0.21 – 0.30) (0.22 – 0.31) (0.13 – 0.24) (0.17 – 0.28) 
Income (€ 1,000) 18.4 18.0 20.8 27.0 
 (17.2 – 19.6) (17.0 – 19.1) (18.7 – 22.9) (19.0 – 35.0) 
Age 32.1 32.6 33.0 34.4 
 (31.5 – 32.7) (31.9 – 33.2) (32.2 – 33.9) (33.6 – 35.1) 
Observations 360 340 200 216 
Note: 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses 
 
 
Table A3. Variable means for the control groups (parents with children aged 6 to 11 years old) 
 1991 1994 1998 2002 
Vote for left bloc 38.7 60.2 51.8 52.5 
 (31.9 – 45.8) (52.4 – 67.6) (44.6 – 58.9) (45.7 – 59.3) 
Vote for SDP 32.7 48.5 37.1 39.2 
 (26.2 – 39.7) (40.8 – 56.3) (30.3 – 44.2) (32.6 – 46.0) 
Sex (1= female) 0.48 0.40 0.47 0.49 
 (0.41 – 0.55) (0.33 – 0.48) (0.40 – 0.54) (0.42 – 0.56) 
Marital status (1=single) 0.060 0.099 0.157 0.198 
 (0.032 – 0.103) (0.059 – 0.154) (0.110 – 0.216) (0.147 – 0.257) 
Unemployed 0.020 0.047 0.036 0.051 
 (0.005 – 0.051) (0.020 – 0.090) (0.014 – 0.071) (0.026 – 0.089) 
Two children  0.50 0.54 0.50 0.51 
 (0.43 – 0.57) (0.36-0.61) (0.43 – 0.57) (0.44 – 0.58) 
Three or more children 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.28 
 (0.18 – 0.31) (0.15 – 0.27) (0.20 – 0.33) (0.22 – 0.34) 
Income (€ 1,000) 19.9 20.6 21.1 23.7 
 (18.6 – 21.2) (18.9 – 22.3) (19.5 – 22.6) (20.9 – 26.4) 
Age 41.4 40.5 39.3 40.0 
 (40.6 – 42.3) (39.5 – 41.5) (38.2 – 40.3) (39.0 – 41.0) 
Observations 199 171 197 217 
Note: 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses 
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Appendix B: Robustness checks 
 
Including demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in the difference-in-difference 
estimations 
 
Table B1. Pocketbook voting: 1994, 1998 & 2002 including demographic and socioeconomic 
controls 
Dep. var. Vote for left bloc (1) (2) (4) 
Election year 1994 1998 2002 
Age of children  0-4 vs. 6-11 0-4 vs. 6-11 0-4 vs. 6-11 
Treatment effect (δ) -0.128** 0.151** -0.063 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.069) 
Time effect (γ) 0.208*** -0.091* 0.009 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) 
Treatment group difference (β) -0.022 -0.150*** -0.005 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.054) 
Control group (α) 0.621*** 0.866*** 0.714*** 
 (0.126) (0.129) (0.123) 
Sex (1= female) 0.005 -0.006 0.000 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) 
Marital status (1=single) 0.059 0.119** 0.068 
 (0.066) (0.061) (0.055) 
Unemployed 0.157** 0.084 0.112 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.072) 
Two children  -0.008 0.061 0.063 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) 
Three or more children -0.054 -0.015 0.044 
 (0.044) (0.050) (0.050) 
Income (€ 1,000) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.003 -0.005* -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Type of voting    
Retrospective voting Consistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Prospective voting Consistent Consistent Consistent 
Observations 1,070 908 830 
Notes: The left bloc includes the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party. The election year of 
1994 (1998, 2002) refers to a difference-in-differences estimation of 1994 vs 1991 (1998 vs 1994, 
2002 vs 1998). Robust standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table B2. Pocketbook voting: 1994, 1998 & 2002 including demographic and socioeconomic 
controls 
Dep. var. Vote for the Social 
Democratic Party 
(1) (2) (4) 
Election year 1994 1998 2002 
Age of children  0-4 vs. 6-11 0-4 vs. 6-11 0-4 vs. 6-11 
Treatment effect (δ) -0.150** 0.132** -0.055 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.067) 
Time effect (γ) 0.155*** -0.110** 0.028 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) 
Treatment group difference (β) 0.028 -0.108** 0.010 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) 
Control group (α) 0.501*** 0.626*** 0.540*** 
 (0.124) (0.129) (0.124) 
Sex (1= female) 0.002 -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) 
Marital status (1=single) -0.037 -0.024 -0.093* 
 (0.069) (0.063) (0.052) 
Unemployed 0.134* 0.049 0.058 
 (0.070) (0.065) (0.072) 
Two children  -0.005 0.062 0.071* 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) 
Three or more children -0.054 -0.040 0.021 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.049) 
Income (€ 1,000) -0.004*** -0.002 -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Type of voting    
Retrospective voting Consistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Prospective voting Consistent Consistent Consistent 
Observations 1,070 908 830 
Notes: The left bloc includes the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party. The election year of 
1994 (1998, 2002) refers to a difference-in-differences estimation of 1994 vs. 1991 (1998 vs. 
1994, 2002 vs. 1998). Robust standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Appendix C: Voting among parents in the control group and among parents with even 
older children 
 
Figure C1.  Vote shares of the left bloc (Social Democratic Party and Left Party) 1982–2002 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002
Voters with children aged 12 to 17 Voters with children aged 6 to 11
 
Note: The figure shows voting among our control group of parents with children 6 to 11 years old 
and among parents with children 12 to 17 years old. None of the respondents in the two groups are 
allowed to have younger children. 
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Appendix D: Dose response test 
 
As a natural extension of our empirical tests of pocketbook voting we test for a dose response 
relationship. If we find that voters with children aged 0 to 2 respond more strongly to the 
promise of a cap on child care fees than voters with children aged 3 to 5, it would be strong 
evidence in favor of a causal relationship between pocketbook promises and voting.33 Table 4 
presents the results from such a test. Since this test divides the treatment group into two parts 
and estimates two more parameters, the power of the test will unavoidably be quite low. For 
this reason we include respondents with five year old children in the treatment group. The 
point estimates of the treatment effects follow the pattern predicted by prospective 
pocketbook voting. The point estimate is higher among parents with the youngest children 
who received the largest benefits from the fee cap. The precision of the estimates is, however, 
too low to conclude that they are different from each other at normal levels of statistical 
significance. Thus, the dose response test doesn’t provide strong evidence in favor of 
prospective pocketbook voting, but neither does it contradict our previous findings. 
 
Table D1: Dose response test for prospective voting in 1998 
Dep. var. Vote for the left bloc (1) 
 0−2 vs. 3−5 vs. 6−11 
Treatment effect 3–5 0.068 
 (0.084) 
Treatment effect 0−2 0.098 
 (0.074) 
Δ 3–5 vs. control 1994 -0.034 
 (0.054) 
Δ 0–2 vs. control 1994 -0.143*** 
 0.068 
Time effect (1994–1998) -0.085* 
 (0.050) 
Control group  0.602*** 
 (0.038) 
Observations 992 
Notes: The election year of 1998 refers to a difference-in-differences 
estimation of 1998 vs 1994. Robust standard errors clustered on 
individuals in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
                                                 
33 Comparing parents with one and parents with two or more children in child care would be a less convincing 
dose response test. On the one hand, additional children mean higher momentary gains from the reform. On the 
other hand, since many parents with one child plan to have more children, they can expect to enjoy the fruits of 
the reform for a longer period of time in the future.   
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